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NINETEENTH CENTURY EQUITY

A

STUDY IN LAW REFORM

ROGER L. SEVERNS'
PART 112
MATURITY

"What, then, is equity?

AND REFORM

Answer:-Whatever has ever been done by a court

of equity."-JEREMY BENTHAM.

E

QUITY was spoken of as a system before the nineteenth century opened. The work of Nottingham in
the seventeenth and of Hardwicke in the eighteenth centuries went far to establish two facts. First, it was now
possible to prophesy with reasonable accuracy what
would be the outcome in most chancery cases. Cases
were being decided with reference to known and established rules. Second, equity bore a fairly definite relation to the common law, and was a supplemental, if
extraordinary, jurisdiction.
Common law and equity crossed swords many times.
The bitterest duel was also the last. The victory won for
the equitable jurisdiction in Coke's time established the
independence of the Court of Chancery in the administration of equity, and in so doing established the equitable jurisdiction as an independent system. But the victory was in one respect costly. By the very fact of the
independence of its court, equity ceased to be a rival of
the common law. The territory ceded to equity was the
right and power in a proper case to relieve against the
1 Professor of Law at Chicago-Kent College of Law.
2 Nineteenth Century Equity, Part I, The Basis of the Equitable Jurisdiction,
appeared in 12 CHICAco-KENT REVIEW 81.
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effect of a common law judgment. But only in a proper
case. Only upon grounds of equity, by now familiar,
where common law processes could not accomplish the
result, might the Chancellor employ his extraordinary
powers. Thus the champions of equity forged its limitations. As Maitland has said, the equitable jurisdiction
is supplemental, presupposing the existence of the common law at every stage. The Court of Chancery might
have become merely another court of original and competing jurisdiction, along with the three great common
law courts. But since it claimed and used extraordinary
powers, its scope became limited by its "reason to be."
With the establishment of the important principle that
only Where legal remedies do not exist or are inadequate
may equity act, the period of maturity begins. The principle is almost as old as the Court of Chancery and was
the basis of decision in the fifteenth century, but it was
not fully understood and applied as a rule of equity until much later. Conflict between the Chancellor and the
common law judges ceased' before the seventeenth century was past, but with the end of the conflict came also
an end of the rivalry between the two systems.'
Four phases or periods in the development of equity
may be traced. As has been emphasized, the origin and
basis of the jurisdiction was the prerogative power of
the Crown-the power to override when necessary the
rigid rules which develop when law becomes a system.
Thus, at first, equity was merely the exercise of the prerogative attribute of the kingship, through various agencies.5 Crown and Council, itinerant justices, Chancellor
and Council, even the common law judges, took a hand
in its administration.
Thus also, at first, equity was merely the flexibility of
royal justice.6 The time came when chancery could create
sW. S. Holdsworth, A History of English Law (3d Ed., Boston: Little,
Brown, and Company, 1922), I, 463-465.
4 12 CHicAGo-KENT REVIEW 99.

612 Cmcaco-KErN RLvaww 89.

6 Willard Barbour, "Some Aspects of Fifteenth-Century Chancery," 31 Harv.
L. Rev. 834-859.

NINETEENTH CENTURY EQUITY

no new writs, and settled rules of procedure and pleading
had been developed in the King's courts. Equity then
broke apart from the common law, because the element
of flexibility was ruled out when the law became a system. Thereafter, equity was the dispensation of a special justice, outside of, and sometimes in derogation of,
the common law.
The cause of this transition is fairly plain. The common law meant merely the royal justice of the King's
court. The common law so long as it retained a great
measure of flexibility was the object of criticism for
two reasons. In the first place, no certainty could exist
where there was so much flexibility; and, in the second
place, a new writ was new law. Law was the King's
law and new law an exercise of the prerogative. Carried to its conclusion, the power to make new law is
tyranny when exercised. Constitutional ideas of the supremacy of law were evolving. The King himself might
be suffered to exercise his prerogative to override old
law, but the exercise of this power by his agents was
another matter.
Criticism drove flexibility out of the common law
practice of the King's court, the criticism springing from
the desire for certainty and the fear of oppression.
Thus, for a time, equity became the executive order of
the King in Council, given only in extraordinary and unusual cases. How this executive authority came to be
exercised by the Chancellor, and at last by the Court
7
of Chancery, has already been described.
The second phase of the development of equity began
with the establishment of the Court of Chancery as
an institution independent of the council. This was the
period of the ecclesiastical chancellors. As has been said,
the equity of this period was similar to the older administrative or purely prerogative equity, but there was a
difference. The common law was in the hands of professional judges, and the Chancellor was beginning to
regard himself as a judicial officer. Thus equity became

7 12

Cc.Aco-KENT

REviEw 91-98.
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less the mere expression of executive commands and
more and more the pronouncement of judicial deliberation.
During the period of the ecclesiastics, the equity of the
Court of Chancery was the substitute for the element of
flexibility so characteristic of early royal justice, and for
the external prerogative equity-which supplied flexibility when law first became a system. Although by the
middle of this period there was little resemblance between the judicial determinations of the Chancellor and
the executive orders of the King in Council, criticism and
protest were directed at the court and its chief officer.
The Chancellor was said to be encroaching upon the field
of common law, and he was warned off. The judicial
powers of the office, it was charged, were used to advance the political influence of the incumbent. More
ominous, though, was the criticism of the uncertainty
with which equity was administered-a criticism which
was natural but no more natural than tlat equity was
uncertain.
At this stage equity could not have been other than
what it was. The sureness and method of scientific inquiry do not often precede the executive order, the purpose of which is to give immediate relief in a particular
situation. Further, equity was no part of the now
established system of the common law. The principle of
flexibility had been outlawed. Rules and principles established by precedent had become the order of the day.
If the basis of his power and the purpose to be served by
its exercise are considered, it does not seem strange that
the Chancellor did not feel himself bound by rules or
precedent and did not formulate either.
But this situation could not continue. The desire for
certainty and definiteness is a natural one. So long as
comparatively few cases came to the Chancellor's attention, no complaint was made of decisions which were influenced by the view he took of the individual merits of
the controversies. Commerce and industry brought about
a great increase in litigation in the Chancellor's court,
and thus certainty in decision became a real necessity.
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It was necessary to be able to forecast with reasonable
accuracy the probable outcome in a chancery case.
Several causes, then, co-operated to produce the third
phase in the development of equity. Selden had said,
"Equity is a roguish thing, . . ." and criticised its uncertainty. The Chancellor was being forced to walk carefully because of the charge of usurpation made by the
judges of the common law. Then, too, the Chancellor
had come to regard himself as a judge, and the judicial
process adopted was leading toward systemization. It
should be mentioned also that the growing volume of
litigation could hardly have any other effect than to create a need for established rules. The Court of Chancery, always undermanned, could scarcely continue to
function unless the increased amount of litigation could
be handled in a systematic way. And, the Chancellor
would have been more than human if he had not tended
to do in one situation as he had done many times before
in similar situations.
As has already been pointed out in the first part of
this study, reaction set in and equity became as definite
and certain as the common law itself. Both a reaction
against uncertainty in the common law and a reaction
against uncertainty in the administration of equity have
now been noticed. The first produced a situation which
made inevitable the establishment of a supplemental
jurisdiction. The second forced the reduction of that
supplemental jurisdiction to a system of rules and principles. Thus equity entered upon the third phase or
period in its development. It remains to observe how
certainty was accomplished and its effect.
The third phase of equity begins with the opening of
the seventeenth century and the chancellorship of Ellesmere. Ellesmere realized to some degree the need for
reform in the administration of equity and took some
steps to correct its faults.' Further improvement was
made during the chancellorship of Bacon when rules
8 Harold Potter, An Introduction to the History of Equity and Its Courts
(London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1931), p. 46.
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regulating the practice of the court were formulated.9
However, equity reached maturity only when the effects of the work of Nottingham, Hardwicke, and perhaps
Eldon were felt. Heneage Finch, Earl of Nottingham,
has been called the "Father of Equity,' 1 0 and in many
respects the title was justly earned. As Lord Keeper
in 1673 and Lord Chancellor in 1675, he brought to the
office not only experience as an equity lawyer and intellectual ability of a high order, but personal integrity
as well. Concerning his accomplishments, Lord Campbell said:
Justly regarding jurisprudence as a science which rests on general principles, and as illustrated and defined by the writings and
rules of former jurists, he bore in mind that without a familiarity
with these it was impossible that his own decisions should be
consistent, systematic, and sound. He had peculiar difficulties
to struggle with-that Equity, which he was to administer, had
sprung up originally in England, more from a desire to get at
what was thought the justice of a particular case between litigating parties, than to lay down methodical rules-that many of
his predecessors had been men not educated in the profession of
the law, and incapable of apprehending legal distinctions-that
their judgments had been generally allowed to fall into oblivion
as more likely to mislead than to guide-and that no attempt had
been made to classify or to systematize those which had been
preserved. He had the sagacity to discover that Equity might
be moulded into a noble code, supplying the deficiencies of the
old feudal doctrines, and adapted to the altering necessities of a
people whose commerce and wealth were so rapidly increasing.11
Unquestionably his experience and training in the principles and method of the common law shaped his administration of equity. Equity received a great impetus
toward definiteness through his efforts.
Nottingham set the course of equity directly toward
organization and system, but Hardwicke is generally
given credit for bringing certainty and system in equity
9 Ibid., p. 50.
10 John Lord Campbell, Lives of the Lord Chancellors and Keepers of the
Great Seal of England (4th Ed., London: John Murray, 1857) IV, 236.
11 Ibid., 248.
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to their full maturity. From the time of Hardwicke,
equity, like the common law, was thought of in terms of
leading cases. Through his decisions, such as that in
Penn v. Lord Baltimore12 and Earl of Chesterfield v.
Janssen," many of the principles governing the exercise
of equitable powers were stated in terms of rules upon
which his successors simply elaborated. Hardwicke became Chancellor in 1736; and, by the time of his resignation of the Great Seal in 1756, equity had definitely become a system of jurisprudence distinct from, and supplemental to, the common law.
Since the time of More, with one exception, the office
of Chancellor was held by common law lawyers. Under
their supervision, the reaction against uncertainty in the
principles of equity developed until the jurisdiction
reached its maturity. Thus, under Hardwicke, equity
approached the point at which rule and precedent governed decision-the point which the common law, for
obvious reasons, reached many years before.
From Hardwicke to Eldon, many of the principles of
modern equity were established. Law and equity were
separate systems existing side by side, each with its
independent sphere. The phrase that the remedy at common law must be inadequate in order to invoke the powers of the Court of Chancery became practically an
apothegm, since certain causes of action were thought of
as distinctly equitable without further inquiry.
The period of certainty and of rule in the administration of equity lasted until near the middle of the nineteenth century, when the period of reform began. It
needs not a great deal of explanation to show that the
abuses and defects which led to the sweeping reforms
of the nineteenth century were partly the result of the
trend toward certainty.
The discussion thus far has been concerned more with
generalizations as to substantive equity, than with the
procedure through which equitable principles were administered. It is in the equity procedure, however, that
12 1 Ves. Sen. 444, 27 Eng. Rep. 1132 (1750).
18 2 Ves. Sen. 125, 28 Eng. Rep. 82 (1750).
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the effects of certainty and definiteness are most obvious.
During the period of the ecclesiastical Chancellors, procedure in equity was simple and swift. As has already
been suggested it was influenced by the summary procedure utilized in certain instances in the ecclesiastical
courts.14 The chancellor was petitioned by the plaintiff
who set forth his grievances in his informal bill. The
defendant was summoned, and the Chancellor examined
him under oath; any other parties deemed necessary
might be summoned and examined. After the Chancellor
had sufficiently informed himself of the facts, lie made
whatever order was necessary to do justice between the
parties. This procedure was the logical outgrowth of the
idea that each case was to be decided according to what
should be done in that particular situation. There was
no necessity of written records. The justice dispensed
was the extraordinary justice of the King given as a
matter of grace and not of right, to be granted or withheld as the sovereign chose in any later similar case.
Likewise the system of pleading had little in common
with the technical special pleading of the common law or
the over-elaborate system of equity pleading of the nineteenth century. The plaintiff's petition or bill was an
informal document stating all the facts and circumstances of his case. The answer of the defendant was
just as informal. The purpose and effect of these pleadings was not, as it was at common law, to arrive at a
specific issue, but to get the whole case before the
Chancellor. This led to a difference in the method of
disposition of cases from that employed at common law.
The Chancellor, as became a dispenser of extraordinary
justice, considered the whole case in all its circumstances
and did not 2onfine his attention to specific issues. 15
Before comparing this simple and common sense procedure and pleading with the elaborate system of the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, some account
must be taken of the organization of the Court of Chancery. The Chancellor was assisted during the middle
14 12 CHICAGo-KENT REvIEw 97.

15 Holdsworth, History of English Law, IX, 338.
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ages by a body of clerks who originally had general
supervision over the issuance of writs. These clerks
were later styled Masters in Chancery. Holdsworth says
that their duties became specialized with the growing
jurisdiction of the court. The primary function of the
Masters was to serve as assistants to the Chancellor and16
to hear and report parts of cases referred to them.
Another official of the court, and one who gradually
acquired true judicial functions, was the Master of the
Rolls. This functionary appears to have had supervision
over the Chancery Rolls and to have been originally a
clerk. As the Masters' duties increased, a large share
of these fell to the Master of the Rolls who began to
exercise a limited jurisdiction and to assume judicial
duties. 7
In addition to these officers, a group of officials known
as the Six Clerks originally kept the records of the court
and acted as solicitors for the parties to litigation.
These positions were fee offices, and long after the Six
Clerks ceased actually to represent litigants they received handsome fees for unnecessary copies of proceedings furnished to their theoretical clients. The Six
Clerks were in turn assisted by the Sixty Clerks who
were paid a portion of the fees received from litigants.
It is obvious that with only two judicial officers, the
court was too grossly understaffed to handle any great
volume of litigation. There were many complaints in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries of the delays which
this inadequacy occasioned. Also, abuses developed
among the other officers of the court which made litigation highly expensive. A wave of protest against the
court and its abuses broke out, and its abolition was
threatened during the time of the Commonwealth.1 8 This
outburst was merely a prelude to the storm which broke
around the court in the nineteenth century. The judicial
staff continued to be inadequate, and litigation there continued costly until public opinion forced reform.
10 Ibid., I, 418.
17 Ibid., I, 419.
18 Ibid., I, 430.
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The increase in judicial business which brought about
specialization in the duties of the Masters, and accompanied and to some degree made necessary the reduction
of equity to a system, was attended also by changes in
procedure and pleading. The desire for certainty led
to elaboration of the common-sense system of practice
previously outlined. This elaboration, carried to absurd
extremes, brought the period of maturity to a close and
created a situation which led to the period of reform.
A picture of what equity and its administration had
become during the last half of the eighteenth century and
the early part of the nineteenth may be drawn from many
sources. Perhaps the classic treatise of the period on
equity pleading is that of John Mitford, afterwards Lord
Redesdale. The title of this book, the first edition of
which was issued in 1782, is significant-'A Treatise on
the Pleadings in Suits In The Court of Chancery, By
English Bill." A glance at its contents indicates that the
informal pleadings allowed by the ecclesiastical chancellors had been replaced by lengthy documents which
formed part of a technical system.
Bills in equity, the petitions of the poor suitors in
former times, were classified into three groups-Original Bills, Bills Not Original, and Bills in the Nature of
Original Bills. Original Bills were further classified as
Bills praying relief, and Bills not praying relief. Bills
Not Original included Supplemental Bills, Bills of Revivor, and Bills of Revivor and Supplement. In addition to
these, Mitford described eight sorts of Bills in the Nature
of Original Bills.1
During this period, pleadings had been given technical
names and equity had borrowed some things from the
system of pleading at common law. In reply to the plaintiff's bill, the defendant, depending upon the character of
the defense he intended to make, might file a disclaimer,
demurrer, plea, or answer. If the plaintiff or complainant, as he was called in equity, filed a replication, the
19 John Mitford, Esq., A Treatise on the Pleadings in Suits in the Court of
Chancery, By English Bill (4th Ed. by George Jeremy, Esq., 3d Am. Ed. by
Charles Edwards, Esq., New York: John S. Voorhies, 1833).
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pleadings were usually at an end save for possible
amendments. Equity pleading never became as elaborate as special pleading at common law. The more informal manner of getting the whole controversy before the
court in one mass, rather than step by step as at common
law, was still adhered to. But equity pleading did become formal, and Mitford's book breathes system and
detail in formal outline.
Order and system are undoubtedly necessary in the
handling of matters with dispatch, but chaos results
when system becomes an end in itself, instead of a means
to an end. In equity, the desire for certainty became
a passion for system, and chaos was the result. John
Wesley wrote in 1745:
I called on the Solicitor I had employed in the suit lately commenced against me in Chancery, and here I first saw that foul
monster a Chancery Bill. A scroll it was of 42 pages in large
folio to tell a story which needed not to have taken up 40 lines,
and stuffed with such stupid senseless improbable lies, many of
them, too, quite foreign to the question, as I believe would have
cost the compiler his life in any Heathen Court either of Greece
20
or Rome, and this is equity in a Christian country.

Jeremy Bentham, in The Rationale of Judicial Evidence,
dlrew the following picture:
In the written instrument, the bill, by which the suit commences,
the plaintiff, not upon oath, enjoying a complete license for
mendacity, tells whatever story suggests itself to his professional
fabricator as best adapted to whatever may be the purpose. In
this bill (the length, and by that means the expense, of which, is
whatever he is pleased to make it,) he possesses an engine of
destruction, by the use of which, the stock of plunderable matter

at the command of the defendant being given (not exceeding a
certain quantity,) the victim may be consigned to certain ruin.
To this purpose, it is not necessary that, from the beginning to
the end, the bill should contain a single syllable of truth: and

(that the license given to him in this respect may be the more
complete and uncontradicted) besides that he is freed from all
20 Quoted by Augustine Birrell, in "Changes in Equity, Procedure and Principles," from A Century of Law Reform (London: Macmillan and Co., 1901),
p. 182.
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apprehension on the score of punishment, he is not, even in this
mode, subjected to any such check as
comparatively unimpressive
21
cross-examination.
of
that
Prolixity and over-elaboration in pleading were not
the only ills to which equity was heir. A r6sum6 of its
procedure indicates that certainty had been overindulged and system had become an end in itself. Holdsworth sketched the equity procedure from the report of
the Chancery Commissioners of 1850: The suit began
with the filing of the plaintiff's bill, a lengthy document
containing numerous interrogatories and engrossed on
parchment. Being summoned, the defendant could file a
demurrer, plea or answer to the bill. The answer set
out the defense and also replied to the plaintiff's interrogatories. Unless the defendant lived within twenty
miles of London, a special commission was necessary to
take the interrogatories. This procedure was both expensive and slow.
After a sufficient answer was filed, a motion was made by the
plaintiff for the production of documents in the defendant's pos;ussion. This order was also the occasion of considerable expense.
it often happened that the answer of the defendant made it nec.sary for the plaintiff to amend his bill, in order either to tra,:c "se the facts stated in the answer, or to introduce new facts.
Vkirther answers were then called for; and the case could then
rtiter be heard on these answers, or the plaintiff could put in a
iormal replication denying the answers. The pleadings being
fl-.ur at an end, the next step was to lay them before counsel to
,.vise on the evidence, and to prepare interrogatories for the
examination of witnesses. On these interrogatories the witnesses
were examined in private, none of the parties nor their agents
being present. As the interrogatories were framed by counsel
without knowing what witnesses would be forthcoming, or what
answers they would give, it was necessary to frame questions to
meet many possible contingencies. It is obvious that, in these
circumstances, no effective cross-examination was possible, so
that it was seldom resorted to. It was necessary to issue a special
21 The Works of Jeremy Bentham (edited by John Bowring, Edinburgh:
William Tait, 1848), VI, 482.
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commission to take the evidence of witnesses in the country-a
process which was at once expensive and slow. When all the
evidence had been taken it was published; and the parties could
get copies on the payment of fees. The case was then ripe for
hearing; but it could be delayed by motions to suppress depositions, or to issue another commission to take further evidence.
When the case was set down for hearing, there were often further
delays, by reason of objections taken on account of the misjoinder
of a party, or nonjoinder of necessary parties, or the death of a
party, or the emerging of new facts. This was the occasion of
bills of revivor or supplement, which often meant that the same
tedious course of procedure must be started anew. Even if all
these defects were cured, it was often still not possible for the
court to pronounce a final judgment unless it was a judgment
dismissing the bill. It was often necessary to send the case to a
master to take accounts or make inquiries. Again, if at the hearing a question of law arose, a special case might be sent to a court
of law, or the court might require a plaintiff to test his legal right
by bringing an action at law. Moreover, if on the depositions
the court could not come to a clear conclusion as to the facts, it
might direct that an issue should be tried by a jury in a court of
22
common law.
In addition to this cumbersome procedure, the steps involving an appeal or rehearing might delay still further
the final settlement of the controversy. This endless
delay, coupled with exorbitant fees charged at every
stage, and corruption and graft among the lesser officials
of the court, created a situation which could not endure.
Perhaps these evils could have been corrected from within the court itself had it not been for the excessive conservatism of its judges.
The most conservative of judges was Lord Eldon, who
became Chancellor in 1801. Although a great and gifted
judge, Eldon's efforts were stripped of much of their
possible benefit by his extreme deliberation. Deliberation before opinion becomes any court, but caution became
Eldon's vice. He took cases under advisement and retained them for years. In his opinions, also, he too
22

Holdsworth, History of Englisb Law, IX, 340-341.
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often doubted the soundness of his own conclusions. Had
he been less industrious and intellectually capable, this
uncertainty might have been proper. Since his qualities
as a judge of equity entitled him to rank with Nottingham and Hardwicke, it was unfortunate that his sense
23
of caution hampered the exercise of those qualities.
The arrears and delays of the court became so serious
during his chancellorship that public sentiment was
aroused.
It was during the chancellorship of Eldon that the ills
of equity attracted the attention of Jeremy Bentham.
Bentham was born in 1748, the son of a wealthy middleclass attorney, who educated him for the bar in the fond
hope that he would some day be Lord Chancellor. However, Bentham had little liking for the practice of his
profession and no desire to occupy the wool-sack. After
his father's death he became what his gifts best fitted
him to be-a legal philosopher and reformer. Dicey
wrote of him:
Bentham, like Voltaire, ultimately owed much of his authority to
the many years for which he was able to press his doctrines upon
the world. Iteration and reiteration are a great force; when
employed by a teacher of genius they may become an irresistible
power. For well nigh sixty years, that is to say to two generations, Bentham preached the necessity, and explained the principles, of law reform. He began his career as an unknown youth
whose ideas were scouted by men of the world as dangerous
paradoxes: he ended it as a revered teacher who numbered among
his disciples lawyers and statesmen of eminence, and had won
over to his leading ideas the most sensible and influential of
24
English reformers.
The whole field of law interested Bentham and he pried
into every nook and cranny of it to find material and examples for his reform doctrines. Sarcasm was his weapon and he used it with effect. He wrote, "Infirmity is
the general lot of human nature; but it is in the practice
23 Sec his opinion in Morice v. The Bishop of Durham, 10 Ves. 521, 32 Eng.
Rep. 947 (1805). "I do not hesitate to say I entertain doubt .... "
24 A. V. Dicey, Lectures on the Relation Between Law and Public Opinion
in England During the Nineteenth Century (London: Macmillan & Co., 1924),
p. 128.
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of the law only that a man may be sure to gain by it.
Designed or undesigned, it is upon the head of the unlearned that the
transgressions of the man of learning
2 5

are avenged.",

In The Rationale of Judicial Evidence, first
in 1827, he wrote of the practice of equity as
then. For special attack he selected two of
vulnerable points in the system-the mode
evidence 2 6 and the distinction between equity

published
he saw it
the most
of taking
and com-

mon law. 27 On the contribution of equity to the cause of

jurisprudence, he made this remark, "Chaos is the grand
rampart of chicane: and for the organization of chaos,
the services of equity have been beyond price."-2s

As to what he termed the absurdity of the distinction
between law and equity, Bentham was especially vituperative, as the following excerpt amply shows:
In every country where there are bad laws, there will be equity
in this sense: in no country except England is there any such
thing as equity, in the sense of another and distinct body of law.
In no other country are there two sorts of law-a sort of law
called equity, a sort of law called law, in a continual state of conflict with one another. It is not the word that is the grievance:
it is the two sets of judges pulling different ways, and, between
them, tearing to pieces the property of the suitors: it is the
oscitancy of the legislator, sitting mute and drivelling, while
under his nose two sets of servants, both saying to him-"Lord,
Lord!" are ordering and disordering the concerns of his household, laying about between them and pillaging according to as
many repugnant sets of rules, never preannounced, and (as completely as they could be made and kept) to all but learned eyes
inscrutable. It is the mountebank imposture of a particular set
of dealers, pretending to possess a monopoly of that almost everywhere too-dear priced commodity, which, if honestly sought for,

would be found everywhere or nowhere. This is your only shop
for equity! None to be had anywhere else for any price!

Equity! applied to what we feel of the practice of the courts
25 Works of Jeremy Bentham, VI, 484.
26 Ibid., VI, 482.
2T Ibid., VII, 288.305.
28 Ibid., VII, 300.
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to which it has given a name, it is a term of derision, a cruel
mockery.
Equity! in what class of ideal beings is it to be found? Is she
like justice, a sort of goddess, and would you see her likeness?
Look for it among Jefferies's and Kirk's lambs. Is it a remedy?
It sweetens like sugar of lead: it lubricates and soothes like oil of
29
vitriol, or butter of antimony.
It can scarcely be said that Bentham was vox clartantis
in deserto, for, by the time of the publication of the
Rationale, others were taking up the cause against the
court. In 1828, Joseph Parkes, a solicitor, published a
history of the Court of Chancery."
In the Preface to
this work he said that "The English Court of Chancery
at the present moment possesses 'effects of the Suitors'
amounting to Forty Millions sterling, at the same time
that it holds in abeyance the right to other personal and
real estates of much greater and unknown value." The
abuses of the Court of Chancery seemed to him to be
one of the greatest grievances of the times. In the same
Preface, he noted that Lord Lyndhurst had succeeded
Eldon and was pledged to early and effective reform.
Parkes's book was published at the time when the
abuses in the Court of Chancery were at their very height
and before any definite steps had been taken toward reform. It is therefore interesting and valuable as a contemporary picture. The principal grievances against the
court were, first, the intolerable delay in the proceedings
and, second, the prohibitive cost of litigation; the latter, a
result both of delay and of the system of fee offices and
its consequent corruption and graft.
The dilatory character of justice administered in the
name of equity was due in part, no doubt, to the inadequacy of the judicial staff of the court. However, much
of the blame must be placed on the reaction toward
certainty which had progressed far beyond the correction of previous evils. This reaction seems responsible
for engrafting upon equity practice the elaborate system
29 Ibid., VII, 302.
30Joseph Parkes, A History of the Court of Chancery (London: Longman,
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of pleading and the detailed rules of procedure which
utterly defeated the purpose of equity-relief against
the inadequacies of the common law. Lord Lyndhurst
himself, successor to Eldon as Lord Chancellor, said,
"There is no doubt that parties only come to the Court
of Chancery when dire necessity compels them to do so."
Several excerpts are quoted by Parkes which indicate
that the press had begun to take up the cause of reform
and to call attention to the abuses in the equity court.
The following is an example:
Gladwin v. Bonner-The Lord Chancellor expressed his sincere
wish, if possible, to remove this unfortunate Family out of the
atmosphere of the Court of Chancery, where they had been contesting their rights ever since his Lordship was a school-boy; and
Mr. Thomas Bonner's Great Grandfather was plaintiff in the
Cause reported in 1 Vesey, by which he was entirely ruined, &c.
He would consider the case, and give his final judgment in a
few days !al
The arrears in the court during this time evidently
reached staggering proportions, for Parkes is authority
for the statement that in the year 1825 there were pending and undisposed of before Lord Eldon and the Vice
Chancellor, 1,577 cases, exclusive of motions and judgments. 2 It is amusing, also, to read in the Appendix to
his book that the Court of Chancery on the Island of
Montserrat in the West Indies, several times had been
presented by the grand jury of the Island as a nuisance !33
The literary efforts at reform in the Court of Chancery reached a high point in 1853 with the publication
of Dickens' Bleak House. Always a reformer at heart,
Dickens drew a true picture of the Court of Chancery
during the first half of the nineteenth century. The book
is a description of the financial and moral ruin of persons so unfortunate as to be born into litigation in that
court. The effect of its delays and corruption upon litigants is the main theme, which has for its motivation
the case of Jarndyce and Jarndyce.
31 Morning Chronicle, Chancery Report, May 30, 1823. Parkes, A History of

the Court of Chancery, p. 1.
32 Ibid., p. 3.
a3 Ibid., p. 597.
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This scarecrow of a suit has, in course of time, become so complicated, that no man alive knows what it means. The parties to it
understand it least; but it has been observed that no two Chancery lawyers can talk about it for five minutes without coming to
a total disagreement as to all the premises. Innumerable children have been born into the cause; innumerable young people
have married into it; innumerable old people have died out of
it. Scores of persons have deliriously found themselves made
parties in Jarndyce and Jarndyce, without knowing how or why;
whole families have inherited legendary hatreds with the suit.
The little plaintiff or defendant, who was promised a new
rocking-horse when Jarndyce and Jarndyce should be settled, has
grown up, possessed himself of a real horse, and trotted away
into another world. Fair wards of court have faded into mothers
and grandmothers; a long procession of Chancellors has come in
and gone out; the legion of bills in the suit have been transformed into mere bills of mortality; there are not three Jarndyces left upon the earth, perhaps, since old Tom Jarndyce in
despair blew his brains out at a coffee-house in Chancery Lane;
but Jarndyce and Jarndyce still drags its weary length before
34
the court, perennially hopeless.
35
Dickens' Lord Chancellor was probably Lyndhurst,
who was pledged, as Parkes noted, to effective reform.
Bleak House presented an unusually accurate sketch of
the Court during the chancellorship of Lyndhurst, although several reforms had been made when the book
was published. The following piece of descriptive writing gives the keynote of the book:
The raw afternoon is rawest, and the dense fog is densest, and
the muddy streets are muddiest, near that leaden-headed old
obstruction, appropiate ornament for the threshold of a leadenheaded old corporation, Temple Bar. And hard by Temple Bar,
in Lincoln's Inn Hall, at the very heart of the fog, sits the Lord
High Chancellor in his High Court of Chancery.
Never can there come fog too thick, never can there come mud
and mire too deep, to assort with the groping and floundering
condition which this High Court of Chancery, most pestilent of
Charles Dickens, Bleak House (New York: Worthington Co., 1888), p. 4.
W. S. Holdsworth, Charles Dickens as a Legal Historian (New Haven:
Yale Univ. Press, 1928), p. 77.
34

85

NINETEENTH CENTURY EQUITY

hoary sinners, holds, this day, in the sight of heaven and
earth....
"Mr. Tangle," says the Lord High Chancellor, latterly something restless under the eloquence of that learned gentleman.
"Mlud," says Mr. Tangle. Mr. Tangle knows more of Jarndyce
and Jarndyce than anybody. He is famous for it - supposed
never to have read anything else since he left school.
"Have you nearly concluded your argument?"
"Mlud, no-variety of points-feel it my duty tsubmit-ludship," is the reply that slides out of Mr. Tangle.
"Several members of the bar are still to be heard, I believe ?"
says the Chancellor, with a slight smile.
Eighteen of Mr. Tangle's learned friends, each armed with a
little summary of eighteen hundred sheets, bob up like eighteen
hammers in a pianaforte, make eighteen bows, and drop into their
eighteen places of obscurity.
"We will proceed with the hearing on Wednesday fortnight,"
says the Lord Chancellor. "For the question at issue is only a
question of costs, a mere bud on the forest tree of the parent suit,
and really will come to a settlement one of these days. "3
The situation pictured by these various writers could
not long continue. The Bench and Bar were too conservative to initiate any sweeping reforms; it remained
for an aroused public opinion to start them. Probably
the writings of Jeremy Bentham did not have an immediate influence on public opinion for they reached a
limited audience; but they did bring to the more thoughtful and better educated persons a realization of the seriousness of the situation. Parkes's book called to the attention of lawyers abuses to which they were too close
otherwise clearly to see. Bleak House reached the general reading public and so may have had wider influence
than either Bentham or Parkes. It must be remembered,
though, that some steps toward reform had already been
taken when Bleak House appeared. The newspapers of
the day kept the Court of Chancery before the public and
so sustained the cause of reform.
36 Dickens, Bleak House, pp. 2, 6.
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The abuses within the Court and its equity administration were too flagrant to endure. Whatever may have
been the direct influences, reform was inevitable. Pressure was brought to bear from outside the legal profession, but the lawyers guided the course of reform.
In 1813 the first step was taken. A bill was passed in
Parliament creating the office of Vice Chancellor to assist the Chancellor in his judicial duties.3 7 This bill was
opposed for political reasons by that noted reformer,
Sir Samuel Romilly, 81 but was passed over his objections.
The measure recognized the inadequacy of the judicial
staff of the court but did not strike at the heart of the
trouble; and, in spite of the Vice Chancellor, the arrears
of the court reached their peak after the creation of the
office.
In 1825, as a result of constant agitation in the House
of Commons, a Chancery Commission was appointed to
investigate abuses in the administration of equity. This
Commission was headed by Lord Eldon, whose ultraconservatism and personal pride foredoomed the efforts
of the Commission to failure. The report glossed over
the most obvious defects and merely recommended improvement in some particular phases of the practice.
"The report of the Commission was an apology for all
the abuses of the court." 39
In 1831, jurisdiction in bankruptcy was taken from the
Court of Chancery and placed in a separate court, thus
relieving some of the pressure of judicial business; and
in 1833 the Master of the Rolls was directed to sit continuously as a judge. His jurisdiction was extended and,
as a result, some of the Chancellor's work was lightened.
In 1842 two additional Vice Chancellors were appointed."
A rather significant reform in procedure was accomplished in 1843, when it was provided that any defendant
might be examined as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff
37 Holdsworth, History of English Law, I, 442.
38 The Life of Sir Samuel Romilly, Written by Himself (3d Ed., London:
John Murray, 1842), II, 299.
39 Holdsworth, History of English Law, I, 443.
40 Ibid., 443.
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or any co-defendant. Heretofore, the only way of accomplishing this was through the unsatisfactory interrogatories in the bill.41
The attention of Parliament was directed to the matter of appeals from the Master of the Rolls and Vice
Chancellors, and in 1851, a court of intermediate appeal,
consisting of two Lord Justices
in Chancery and the
42
Lord Chancellor, was created.
However, it was not until 1852 that the first truly important reforms were accomplished. The first matter
attacked was the expense and abuses attending the
system of fee offices. The appointment of Masters had
been transferred to the Crown and the compensation
fixed on a salary basis in 1833. In 1842 the Six Clerks
had been abolished. But in 1852 the Masters were abolished and their functions taken over by judges sitting
in chambers. Provision was made for appointment by
the Master of the Rolls and Vice Chancellors of Chief
Clerks, who were to be paid by salary. Thus the old
abuses of special fees for office copies that no one ever
3
needed were abolished.1
Another important step was taken in 1852. It will be
remembered that the only testimony of witnesses admissible, according to Chancery practice, was that taken before officers of the court upon previously framed interrogatories. This mode of taking testimony was abolished
in 1852, and a plaintiff was empowered to give notice
to the defendant that the evidence of the case should be
taken either orally or upon affidavit. The act provided
that the taking of evidence should be in the presence of
the parties or their counsel and that the witnesses should
44
be subject to cross examination and re-examination.
The year 1852 may fairly be taken as an epoch in the history
of the old Court of Chancery. After 1852 it was a reformed
Court. The Act of that year introduced many useful reforms.
It abolished the practice of engrossing Bills on parchment and
Augustine Birrell, A Century of Law Reform, p. 187.
42 Holdsworth, History of English Law, I, 443.
43 Ibid., 444-445.
44 Birrell, A Century of Law Reform, p. 190.
41
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substituted printed Bills, it at least endeavored to get rid of
prolixity in pleadings, it simplified procedure in many ways too
numerous to mention, and particularly as to objections for want
of parties, and it took the first step towards the union of the
jurisdictions by giving the Court of Chancery full power to
determine any question of law which in the judgment of the
Court it was necessary to decide previously to the decision of
the equitable question at issue between the parties, and it declared it no longer lawful to the Court of Chancery to direct a
4
case to be stated for the opinion of any Court of Common Law. 5
Even the Act of 1852 did not correct the defects to the
extent necessary. Certainty and definiteness had run
their course. The reaction toward reform had gathered
momentum and was not to be stopped. The pendulum
was swinging back toward simplification, and in some
degree toward flexibility.
In 1873, Parliament determined to make a clean sweep
of the entire court system. Accordingly, the first Judicature Act was passed in that year to be effective in 1875.
By the terms of the Act the principal courts, including
the Court of Chancery, were consolidated to form one
Supreme Court of Judicature. This court was then divided into two parts, the High Court of Justice and the
Court of Appeal. The jurisdiction formerly exercised
by the Court of Chancery was thus vested in the High
Court of Justice. Moreover, it was provided that the
rules of law and equity should be administered concurrently in the High Court; and, subject to certain limitations, where equity and law were in conflict the rules of
equity were to prevail."'
As a result of these changes in the judicial system and
in the administration of the law, sweeping changes in
procedure and pleading were inevitable. By court rules,
the substitution of oral testimony for written evidence
was accomplished. Equally important, a unified and
simplified code of pleading and procedure for all divisions of the High Court became effective. Thus, at last,
45 Ibid., p. 191.
46 Holdsworth, History of English Law, I, 640.
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the technical, over-elaborate system of pleading which
Bentham ridiculed was abolished."'
The spirit of the nineteenth century was the spirit of
reform. Within its span the reaction toward certainty
and definiteness in the administration of equity came to
grief because system in equity became an end in itself,
instead of a tool to promote the ends of justice. The
result was a movement away from this over-mechanization, and equity entered its fourth phase, the period of
reform. The aicomplishments of the reform period may
be briefly summarized. Through the reconstruction of
the court system, the judicial staff became adequate to
handle the volume of litigation. Fee offices were abolished, and some of the terrific costs of litigation were
done away with. The system of pleading was simplified
and became understandable. Procedure, unified in all
branches of the High Court, became contributory to the
ends of justice rather than to the ends of delay. Finally,
equity and law became a united system, and what there
was of flexibility remaining in the rules of equity returned again to supply that element in the common law.
In this course of action and reaction that has been the
story of equity, it is to be observed that, although every
movement was carried too far and necessitated the retracing of steps, from every phase something of permanent benefit has been retained. In the most recent
phase, the period of reform, the ground gained under
Nottingham and Hardwicke has not been lost. The rules
of substantive equity remain much the same as when first
established. In many respects they are broad enough to
permit application to changing times and conditions of
men. If equity is today a rather rigid system of rules,
the flexing of those rules when necessary is in the hands
of the legislature. Although it has swung from one extreme to another, even Jeremy Bentham admitted that
"Equity judicature.. . was in effect contributory also in
a very high degree to the direct ends of justice: to the
prevention of misdecision, and of failure of justice. ' ' 48
4T
4S

Birrell, A Century of Law Reform, pp. 194-195.
Works of Jeremy Bentham, VII, 290.

